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  We examine an unusual form of path dependence, in which suppliers that take 
different decision paths end up in the same position: excessive vertical integration of the 
personal selling function.  We argue that this is the case even though outsourcing is more 
seriously considered than ever, and economic arguments for outsourcing the sales function 
are compelling.  We develop an institutional explanation at the meso level (a combination of 
individual, organization, and environmental forces, explicitly considering how these levels 
combine).  This meso-analysis focuses on four forces driving firms toward being locked into 
employee sales forces.  The first force rests on inherent characteristics of the sales function, 
which is low in inclusiveness and suffers from ambiguous standards of desirable 
performance.  The second force rests on the interplay between one motivated individual, the 
director of sales, who has inordinate decision-making influence, and the rest of the 
organization, which is motivated to accept the sales director's recommendations without 
sufficient challenge.  The third force is a set of three path-dependence mechanisms: 
legitimacy, need for a critical mass, and asymmetric switching costs between governance 
modes.  The last force rests on characteristics of the institution of outsourcing sales.  We 
enumerate and classify these mechanisms, illustrating them with a simple simulation of how 
outsourcing sales becomes rare.  We close with testable propositions about which firms are 




Path Dependence in Personal Selling:  
A Meso-Analysis of Vertical Integration  
 
"Where all think alike, no one thinks very much." 
--Walter Lippman 
 
In a developed economy, competitive forces should drive out inefficient, ineffective 
managerial practices.  We explain how the opposite can occur in a marketing setting.  We 
focus on how suboptimal practices become institutionalized, quashing efforts to expunge 
them.  We explain how this occurs even when managers are eager to improve their operating 
results and protective regulation does not constrain market selection mechanisms. 
We consider a major strategic decision in marketing, whether to outsource the personal 
selling function or vertically integrate it.  In spite of strong theoretical arguments in favor of 
outsourcing (e.g. Anderson 1985), selling is largely performed in house in the U.S. and 
Canada.  Below, we argue that an outsourcing boom has swept North America, and has 
affected almost every function except personal selling.  Why has this critical function been 
left behind?  Why do so many firms, newly ready to outsource even such core functions as 
production, R&D, and personnel management, refuse to outsource their sales force? 
To understand that, we adopt a multi-level (meso) process perspective, looking at the 
individual, organization, environment, and bridging mechanisms among these levels (House, 
Rousseau and Thomas-Hunt 1995).  We examine how firms make then revise the integration 
decision in personal selling.  We propose that vertical integration in selling is a robust 
phenomenon in which firms gravitate to direct sales forces more than would be suggested by 
arguments of maximizing economic fitness.  This over usage of direct sales forces reflects an 
unusual form of path dependence.  Most path-dependence explanations consider firms that 
 1    start in the same place, follow diverging paths, and eventually find themselves unable to 
duplicate other firm’s behaviors (e.g. Becker and Gerhart 1996).  Firms thus grow different in 
their capabilities because they are constrained by the path taken (Nelson 1995).  In contrast, 
we propose that even firms that start in different places and take different paths can come to 
the same decision—to employ their own sales forces.  Different paths to the same destination 
are usually explained by standards races, but we do not suggest such a mechanism. 
Instead, we suggest that four institutional forces drive diverse firms to a common 
outcome—an implausibly high level of in-house selling.  These forces are 1) characteristics 
of the personal selling function, 2) characteristics of the institution of outsourced sales forces, 
3) the interplay between two levels of the company, the director of sales and other 
organization decision makers, and 4) mechanisms of path dependence.  To illustrate the 
impact of such mechanisms, we simulate a variety of sales environments.  We show that 
under a wide range of circumstances, industries converge to what we observe—very high 
levels of vertical integration of selling—in no more than five to ten years. 
This paper answers a call by Grewal and Dharwadkar (2002) to incorporate both 
economic-fitness and social-fitness arguments and to explain when each will prevail.  Having 
sketched how so many firms become trapped into operating their own sales forces, even if 
the firms themselves desire to outsource, we turn to how to change this situation.  We predict 
which firms will innovate by outsourcing selling, breaking the tyranny of incrementalism for 
this issue.  We conclude with propositions as to when firms will not merely survive but 
prosper by reconsidering their strategic use of outsourcing in personal selling. 
Defining the Rep 
 
The sales force is to business markets what advertising is to consumer markets: an 
important means of differentiation, the principal means of communication with the buyer, 
 2    and a critical marketing tool. The personal selling function in business-to-business markets 
can be outsourced to an independent selling organization, a "manufacturers' representative," 
often shortened to "rep."  This institution goes by different labels in different industries, e.g. 
"agents," "commission agents," or "agencies" (in insurance or electronic components), or 
"brokers" (in financial services).  We label them "Reps," capitalizing to avoid confusing 
these professional sales firms with individuals. 
Reps provide purely selling services on a contractual basis for makers of goods or 
originators of services (legally, the principals in a principal-agent relationship).  Reps 
specialize in selling only; unlike distributors, they do not take title to what they sell, do not 
set their own prices, and do not handle merchandise.  Rep organizations share risk with the 
principal: typically, they absorb all selling expenses and are paid by commission on sales 
realized (at the principal’s prices).  The principal, not the Rep, is responsible for order 
settlement and fulfilment.  Unlike most distributors, Reps usually accord category exclusivity 
to each principal.  Reps sell a "portfolio" of complementary product categories, one brand per 
category, based on their customers’ needs and buying patterns.  In short, Reps are a way to 
outsource only the selling function, as opposed to selling and the seven other flows of the 
distribution function (Coughlan et. al. 2001).  Indeed, Reps sell to distributors (who are 
customers of a producer).  Conversely, Reps may sell for some distributors. 
Vertical Integration of the Personal Selling Function 
 
Thirty years ago, it was startling to suggest that any business function could conceivably 
be outsourced, and that many should be.  Today, it is widely recognized that not all functions, 
even those fundamental to a business’s existence, must be performed by employees of that 
business.  Even such central functions as R&D, product development, production, sales, 
customer support, computing, and human resource management can (and often should) be 
 3    performed by employees of another business.  Outsourcing of anything at all is a legitimate 
option considered worthy of debate by any company in any market (Lepak and Snell 1999).   
Several scholars have investigated the different reasons explaining the heightened 
interest in outsourcing (e.g.: Poppo & Zenger 1998, Dragonetti, Dalsace & Cool 2002). One 
likely reason is the recognition that there are many ways to govern a relationship with 
another organization.  Between the extremes of arm's-length contracting ("market") and 
vertical integration ("hierarchy") lies a wealth of arrangements offering the ability to design 
relationships of varying closeness, influence, risk, and resource commitment.  These 
"relational contracts" include alliances, joint ventures, franchises, and other organizational 
forms which vary considerably in structure and function (Heide 1994, Gulati and Singh 
1998).  Firms have responded with such enthusiasm to these new possibilities that industry 
observers increasingly wonder what justifies vertically integrating almost any function 
(Auguste et al. 2002).  In theory, this enthusiasm should extend to personal selling in B2B 
markets. 
Production Cost Advantages 
 
In principle, outsourcing selling is appealing in terms of long-term economic efficiency 
(Anderson 1985, Williamson 1996).  As a third-party specialist, the Rep enjoys economies of 
scale and scope by pooling the demands of many principals for representation, benefits that 
market pressures oblige the Rep to share with its principals.  In selling, economies of scope 
are particularly important because for each sales call on each prospect, a salesperson must 
cover the marginal costs of the sale, such as travel, entertainment, samples, and return from 
foregone calls to other prospects.  Because Reps sell many items that the customer buys 
(creating a broad assortment from multiple suppliers), they offer buyers "one-stop shopping."  
 4    The B2B buyer should be more willing to see a Rep, and even a small prospect should be 
worth a sales call because it may buy many items, albeit in small quantities. 
In contrast, direct salespeople sell only their companies’ products.  Rarely can a direct 
salesperson match the Rep's breadth of line.  The narrower the line, the larger a prospect must 
be to justify a sales call.  Moreover, the narrower the line, the less likely buyers are to accept 
a call except for large orders.  This is the "coverage" argument: covering a market thoroughly 
rapidly becomes prohibitively expensive unless the salesperson carries a broad line.  
By representing multiple (non-competing) manufacturers, Reps pool their demands for 
selling services to create a large scale, pure selling organization within a coherent product 
categorization, exploiting benefits of specialization in running the sales force.  In principle, 
Reps can gather more and better market intelligence by meeting the related needs of a broad 
range of customers, although, this advantage is limited by most Reps’ regional nature. 
Transaction Cost Advantages 
 
Outsourcing the selling function often reduces transaction costs.  One reason is that the 
Rep is outside the principal’s organizational politics and is motivated by powerful 
entrepreneurial incentives.  Gimeno et al. (1997) demonstrate empirically how powerful these 
incentives are: entrepreneurs derive both monetary and psychic income such that they 
maintain businesses when their economic performance is unsatisfactory.  This is pronounced 
when the business has a narrow scope or uses assets that are difficult to redeploy.  Reps fit 
this description, as pure selling in one market is narrow and the assets (relationships and 
knowledge) are specialized to a customer base and a product category. 
Being outside the politics of the producer generates benefits for a salesperson.  Inside a 
manufacturer or service provider, selling is often viewed as peripheral and lower-status 
(Swenson et al. 1993). But selling is the Rep's only function; the successful salesperson is 
 5    accorded the organization’s highest status.  Thus, Reps can pay sales people without concern 
for whether their income surpasses the plant manager's.  Reps also offer sales people the 
challenge of selling a varied product portfolio to a large customer base, Moreover, in North 
America direct salespeople are subject to frequent transfers.  Rep agencies are a way for an 
individual who wants a career in sales to be valued and to succeed in an organization without 
uprooting geographically.  In short, independence from a producing organization gives Reps 
the ability to recruit and retain salespeople with considerable success. 
Transaction cost analysis posits that these factors should drive a firm to use Reps unless 
two circumstances prevail.  First, selling jobs that result in high levels of idiosyncratic assets 
(knowledge, relationships, and producer-specific routines) should be filled by direct 
salespeople.  Second, when the producer discerns results from the activities of a third party 
that do not index performance well, the producer faces internal uncertainty (aka behavioral 
uncertainty or performance ambiguity).  Vertical integration is justified because it enables the 
principal to obtain other information from monitoring behavior to better index performance.  
Selling jobs are ambiguous when the task is complex and multi-faceted; making current sales 
is but only part of the picture.  A study by Anderson (1985) in the electronic components 
industry finds that industry practices reflect the transaction-cost approach to personal selling.  
Further, there is evidence that following transaction-cost prescriptions improves selling 
efficiency, especially in turbulent environments (Anderson 1988). 
Bypassed by the Outsourcing Boom 
 
On paper, then, outsourcing selling offers the producer lower production and transaction 
costs, at lower overhead, for jobs that are not highly idiosyncratic for which performance is 
not very difficult to evaluate.  This suggests Reps should be common, but in practice, they 
are not.  We contend that the outsourcing boom has bypassed the selling function. 
 6    Terminology clouds the classification of sales institutions.
1  According to U.S. census 
data, Reps (broadly construed) account for 11% of U.S. wholesale sales volume, the other 
89% is carried out by resellers (both independent and in-house) (Fein 1999).  About half of 
all producers in the U.S. use Reps (Dishman 1996).  Thus, Reps appear common, but closer 
examination reveals many principals are merely nominal outsourcers.  A producer recorded 
as using Reps may do business primarily through a “direct” sales force, while contracting 
with a Rep for only limited products, or only specialty markets (e.g. the military PX system) 
or less desirable geographies (e.g. a remote or sparsely populated state 
Has the usage of Reps been growing along with the general increase of outsourcing?  
Aggregate census figures suggest that Reps gained ground in the 1970s and 1980s, but not 
since then.  Many firms have moved from direct to Rep sales forces (usually quietly, as no 
firm seeks to publicize layoffs).  However, these switches are offset by other firms that have 
done the reverse (Dishman 1996).  In short, it appears that Reps are an institutional form that 
is well established and healthy.  Yet the bulk of personal selling in the business-to-business 
domain is still performed by salespeople employed directly by the producer, and the 
outsourcing boom has not benefited Reps greatly. 
What is the path by which company sales forces, rather than contract sales forces, 
become the dominant mode of organizing selling?  Below, we sketch four forces (Figure 1) 
driving firms to company sales forces.  Table 1 summarizes our arguments and organizes 
them by the Grewal and Dharwadkar (2002) taxonomy of institutional forces that are 
cognitive (why managers can't see what to do), normative (why managers won't do what 
should be done), or regulatory (why managers are legally unable to do what should be done). 
Force 1: Characteristics of the Selling Function 
 
 7    The selling function possesses two characteristics critical to understanding the rarity of 
outsourcing.  First, the sales function in many producing organizations is low in 
inclusiveness, how much the activities of one unit involve those of another.  Second, this 
function has ambiguous standards of desirable performance. 
Low inclusiveness 
Producer organizations frequently treat sales as a stand-alone function (often a separate 
division): products and services are handed off to the sales force, which is expected simply to 
sell them.  The low inclusiveness of the selling function is enhanced because many producers 
consider it a bit mysterious and hold it apart from the rest of the company (Churchill et al. 
2000).  In a later section, we will argue that low inclusiveness impedes the firm's make-or-
buy analyses. 
Many producers fail to appreciate the challenges inherent in selling.  Common fallacies 
are that good salespeople are born, not made (Churchill et. al. 1985), and that salespeople 
require little management.  The reality is that selling skills must be carefully developed (Cron 
and Slocum 1986), and that sales management is a difficult and complex task (Anderson and 
Oliver 1987).  Good sales management is not common: when practiced, it creates significant 
gains in both effectiveness and productivity (Mantrala, Sinha and Zoltners 1992).   Yet, 
because they focus on production and not the selling function, many of a firm’s managers do 
not appreciate the cost savings, nor the gain in total contribution, that a well-managed sales 
force will create.  Thus, the organization will believe that it can do selling function well. 
Ambiguous Standards of Desirable Performance 
 
Performance Uncertainty 
The performance of any sales force (whether Rep or employee) is multi-faceted and 
difficult to reduce to one indicator.  It also takes time to accrue: an industrial sale requires 
 8    multiple calls, and customer relationships build slowly (Churchill et al. 2000).  The obvious 
measure is total sales volume, but the producer is interested in more than maximizing overall 
volume.  Sales force objectives exist for each product, at desired prices (hence margins), to 
targeted customers, with target amounts of added services.  Hence, performance will be 
evaluated on a composite of indicators, such as market share (by customer segment and by 
product), cost to serve, growth of new accounts, retention of existing accounts, and so forth.  
And these are only the measures of outputs.  The firm may also evaluate performance in 
terms of activities (such as providing market intelligence).  For employee salespeople, 
additional subjective indicators may be used that reflect the manager's discretion.  Not 
surprisingly, the correlation between objective and subjective sales performance indicators 
averages a modest .4 (Rich et. al. 1999).  Whatever the results are, they should be compared 
to the cost of maintaining the sales force (Anderson 1988).  Here, producers using Reps have 
a clear picture.  But for a direct sales force, many sales-related costs may be grouped with 
administrative overhead (SG&A) and very difficult to assess. 
The greatest complication in evaluating performance is the baseline problem.  Sales 
forces almost invariably generate sales: how large should that volume be before the producer 
can conclude its selling efforts are successful?  The wrong governance decision (Rep or 
direct) generates lower sales, lower contribution margins, and higher selling costs.  But lower 
or higher than what?  The greatest difficulty is gauging results obtained relative to results that 
would have been obtained had the firm governed its sales force differently--which is 
unobservable (Masten 1993).  This obliges the producer to infer the results it would have 
achieved from the road not taken (this Rep, a different Rep, or a direct sales force).   
So far, we have assumed that the producer wants a high-performing sales force in terms 
of current economic results.  Next we turn to alternative definitions of performance, ones that 
 9    are long term and uncertain.  Market feedback mechanisms for such strategic goals are even 
weaker than for financial goals.  Below, we consider three reasons why a firm may choose 
in-house selling, knowingly compromising short-run efficiency, in pursuit of a higher 
(strategic) goal. 
Strategic Goals 
Signaling.  A signal is an action or announcement that conveys credible information 
about the sender’s intention and abilities.  Hiring a sales force is an important investment 
both in terms of money and time, costly to reverse.  Hiring a sales force therefore signals to 
all constituencies, especially to customers and competitors, that the firm is committed to the 
product line. The producing firm may believe that the signal will improve its market position, 
so that it will recoup at least partially its investment in a direct sales force.  
 
Strategic control. keeping strategic control over the selling function may itself be a 
goal.  Such a goal is less often announced, perhaps because its rationale is less clear.  Why 
couldn’t a producer maintain strategic control while using a Rep? 
Agency theory provides theoretical support for why using Reps affords weaker control 
to the producer.  An integrated sales force provides a short and direct link to the customer: 
the firm acts as a principal and hires multiple agents (its employees) to sell to its customers. 
The hierarchical link gives several advantages to the organization: through fiat, rules of 
conduct, legitimate authority, the right to monitor activity, and job design, companies can 
restrict their employees' actions in a way that not possible in a market context (Williamson 
1996). Furthermore, facing individuals, the firm is de facto more powerful: employees have 
only one employer, creating a high dependence relationship.  If all else fails, the threat of 
dismissal is powerful and credible.  Thus, the firm can micro-manage employee’s work. 
 10    In contrast, when a firm uses Reps, the chain of control has unfavorable characteristics, 
shown in Figure 2.  First, the chain is longer.  The principal contracts with the Rep. In turn, 
the Rep acts as a principal and hires sales representatives. The Rep has a dual role as both 
agent and principal.  The firm-to-salesperson link is replaced by a firm-to-firm link.  The 
supplier manages its relationship with the Rep, which blocks the supplier's efforts to micro-
manage the Rep's employees (Liebeskind 1996).  Further, the power balance in the principal-
agent relationship has been altered; the Rep may be as or more powerful than the producer. 
Further, the focal producer is usually not the only one with which the Rep has 
contractual ties. The Rep’s principals should be non-competing, although product lines 
should be related enough to justify calling on the same customers. But it is difficult to 
achieve zero overlap.  Further, product lines change due to principals' competitive moves, 
such as product extensions, repositioning, or diversification. These can lead to some form of 
competition in some segments, and thus to bitter discussions and renegotiations.  
Finally, all the Rep's principals do de facto compete among themselves, not for the 
customer's order but for the resources of the Rep. The Rep determines the customers to call 
on, the call patterns to follow, and the products on which to put selling efforts.  These choices 
have important implications in terms of sales result for each principal.  
Coping with the future.  The producer may justify using employee salespeople as a 
generalized way to cope with (unspecified) future change.  Under this perspective, one value 
of going direct is that it opens new perspectives to the firm.  The analogy is of investing in an 
integrated sales force as a real option (Kogut and Kulatilaka 2001).  Like an option, this 
investment gives the right, but not the obligation, to participate in future projects.  Examples 
might include a launch of a new product line, which cannot be sold through the current Reps 
because it competes with the Reps’ other products, or a switch to “systems selling,” requiring 
 11    an in-depth involvement of the firm’s skilled development engineers.  Another example is the 
possibility to carry other firms’ products (a carrier-rider relationship) through one's integrated 
sales force.  These strategic moves may not be undertaken if the firm uses Reps.  
As Bowman and Moskowitz (2001) underscore, options reasoning is not a blanket 
justification for investing in assets that may never be used.  Nevertheless, the intuitive 
analogy of “keeping options open,” and the idea of proactively exploiting risks (Kogut and 
Kulatilaka 2001) may be powerful enough to motivate some managers to use employee 
salespeople, even in the absence of a current need or plan. 
To this point, we have detailed how two characteristics of the sales function—low 
inclusiveness and ambiguous standards of desirable performance—work to limit outsourcing.  
These features of selling underlie our meso-analysis.  Following Figure 1, we now describe 
how interactions across different levels of aggregation further dampen outsourcing. 
Force #2: A Meso Analysis of Organizational Decision Making  
The Influence of the Director of Sales 
 
  The first step of meso analysis to identify key individuals and to examine the role 
they play and how they exert influence (House, Rousseau, and Thomas-Hunt 1995).  We 
argue that the director of sales has inordinate influence in the decision whether to outsource 
the selling function.  At first glance, this should not be true.  Outsourcing selling is a strategic 
decision, and since most strategic decisions are made by groups of top managers, the 
individual's influence is usually diluted.  However, in practice top management is unlikely to 
become more than nominally involved in a sales force structure decision (Hambrick, Cho, 
and Chen 1996).  Further, we have argued earlier that personal selling is low in inclusiveness: 
House et al (1995) argue that low inclusiveness gives rise to autonomous behavior.   
 12    As side effects of holding sales apart, albeit accountable, the sales director not only has 
considerable discretion over sales affairs, but also plays a large role in framing sales 
decisions for the rest of the organization.  We focus on how the sales director will 1) frame 
the organization's needs vis-à-vis the selling function, 2) frame the organization's 
alternatives, and 3) factor in his/her individual career preferences and perceptual biases in 
exerting influence.  That standards of desirable performance are ambiguous enlarges the sales 
director’s ability to influence a major strategic decision. 
The Sales Director Frames the Organization's Needs 
Transaction cost analysis argues that Reps should be used when assets needed to 
perform the selling function are not highly idiosyncratic, or when selling is not performed on 
a large enough scale to justify in-house overhead (Anderson 1985).  However, the sales 
director is likely to question whether these conditions apply.  The director is motivated to 
believe that his/her sales operation will be successful, thereby achieving large scale.  And the 
director is likely to believe that his/her firm’s selling function is idiosyncratic in a valuable 
way, in part because it is difficult to establish just how much this is so.  
Most managers focus on their own firms and respond to uniqueness and novelty in their 
environment (Isenberg 1994).  Unless they have changed jobs often or been consultants with 
a number of clients, they know best their own firm. Combined, the lack of familiarity with 
other firms, focus on their own firm, and attention to novelty may lead to over-emphasizing 
the uniqueness of their firm’s products, selling process, salespeople, customers, and 
management style. This tendency is exacerbated; the selling function contains much tacit 
knowledge, which argues for internal control (Ghosh and John 1999, Hitt, et. al. 2001).  
Lepak and Snell (1999) underscore this phenomenon, noting that human capital often 
becomes idiosyncratic in a path dependent way, requires tacit skills and knowledge, and is 
 13    acquired by doing.  Of course, to be an asset, the firm's selling routines should be both 
idiosyncratic and superior.  If not, these routines are not an asset and may even be a liability. 
How genuinely idiosyncratic is the firm's selling program?  It may be less so than meets 
the eye.  There is considerable commonality in how sales is carried out (Calvin 2001), even 
though the commonality may be less evident than in a tangible activity such as production.  
And the commercial value of sales relationships is easy to overstate: analyses of the 
productivity of sales time routinely demonstrate the salesperson's fallacy of believing that 
good relationships are the most profitable ones (Lodish 1980).   
Nonetheless, the director is likely to believe that "our way" of selling is both 
idiosyncratic and valuable.  A director of sales is motivated to do so as part of the role.  Just 
as brand managers believe that their product is unique and offers superior value to their 
customers, sales managers believe that what they do is nonstandard and a better way to carry 
out the function.  Although market research regularly contradicts the brand manager's beliefs 
(Moorman, Zaltman and Deshpandé 1992), there is no equivalent for the director of sales.  
The tacitness of sales makes it difficult to falsify the assumption that "our way" is unusual 
and valuable.  Those who challenge the sales director on this issue will find that the low 
inclusiveness of the function makes their case difficult to argue. 
The Sales Director Frames the Organization's Alternatives 
The egocentricity or positivity bias in attributions (Ross and Sicoli 1979) occurs because 
we understand best the environment from which we come, and often with this understanding 
comes a preference for the familiar.  Since most sales are made by employee salespeople and 
managed by employee sales managers, the director of sales is likely to be familiar with the 
vertically integrated context and is unlikely to be well acquainted with the institution of Reps.  
Capability, as well as familiarity, plays a role.  Anderson, Mehta, and Dubinsky (2003) point 
 14    out that the knowledge, skills, aptitudes, and other characteristics (KSAOs) of a sales 
manager are intra-organizational in nature, with the focus on attending to one’s own 
salespeople.  In contrast, dealing with another firm (such as a distributor or a Rep) requires 
KSAOs that are inter-organizational in nature—and relatively few sales managers acquire 
these skill sets in equal measure.   
For several reasons the sales director will be in a position to frame the producer's 
alternatives.  This framing carries great weight due to the low inclusiveness of the selling 
function.  
Personal Preferences.  Personal preferences are likely to influence the sales director’s 
recommendation.  One such preference is to manage one’s own career and one’s ability to 
influence the organization. An internal sales force is an organizationally formidable entity, 
and the manager of such an entity is likely to carry a significant level of power. On the other 
hand, a set of Reps, geographically distant and structurally disconnected from the 
organization, combined with the more minimal internal organization necessary to support the 
Reps, is not nearly as visible or formidable.  Ironically, the low overhead and variable cost of 
outsourcing sales minimizes the power of the manager of this function.  Thus, the sales 
director gains power through an internal sales force and can influence organizational and 
personal outcomes more (Lepak and Snell 1999).  
Perceptual Biases of the Sales Director.  Aside from personal preferences, a number of 
perceptual biases can affect the director’s understanding of the possibilities of the decision. 
The availability bias (Tversky and Kahneman 1973) suggests that more salient 
information in memory is more likely to be considered in a decision. The sales director 
interfaces with the Rep's managers (more than its salespeople), may make some key-account 
sales personally, and may manage a key-account sales force that sells direct.  These hands-on 
 15    experiences raise the salience of the internal sales force, compared to the out-of-sight 
(possibly out-of-experience) Rep. 
Overconfidence (Fischhoff, Slovic and Licthenstein 1977) means that, given a difficult 
problem, humans systematically overestimate their likelihood of solving it correctly.  
Achieving the organization’s sales goals is challenging: sales managers may overestimate the 
internal sales force’s ability to do so. 
Persistence of set is the idea that humans persist in using decision strategies long after 
they have been shown not to work well (Luchins 1942).  Repeated, successful use of a 
strategy inhibits learning better strategies.  Sales managers may simply not see another 
solution (Reps), even if that solution is better than the current internal sales force.
2  
Relatedly, functional fixedness is the tendency to think of an object as having only one 
function and to ignore less obvious ways to use it (Dunker 1945).  Managers may see only 
the option to have salespeople (the object) as an internal sales force (the function), rather than 
access them through another employer (another function).   
In short, sales managers' experience, skills, personal preferences, and biased perceptions 
suggest that they will lean easily towards the direct sales force. Once a priori superiority of 
company sales forces is perceived, the motivated decision maker bias (Kunda 1990) supports 
that tendency: once we categorize something as good or bad, we unconsciously code 
additional information to support that categorization.  The confirmation bias (Einhorn and 
Hogarth 1978) exacerbates this; we are more likely to search for information confirming our 
beliefs vs. information disconfirming our beliefs. Thus, a prior tendency toward the direct 
sales force will be exacerbated due to these categorization and search biases. 
Stylized Break-Even Analysis.  Another factor influencing the sales director’s decision 
is how the Rep/direct analysis is done.  The most common approach is a stylized breakeven 
 16    analysis (Dishman 1996), in which revenue is plotted against the cost of each type of sales 
force.  This analysis, readily available in texts, trade books, and the business press, follows. 
Reps are compensated by commission on sales with no reimbursement of their selling 
costs.  The Rep's commission rate is low (average 5.3% across all industries
3).  Thus, at low 
sales levels, outsourcing is widely thought to be less costly than vertical integration.  This 
conclusion is thought to reverse as sales grow.  It is typically assumed that fixed costs don't 
rise, while the strictly variable cost of a Rep continues to mount in linear fashion.  Hence, 
there is always a crossover point, a level of volume beyond which direct sales forces are 
more economical.  This appealingly simple analysis points unequivocally to direct sales 
forces for all but small product lines.   
It is unusual to see in print a discussion of the questionable assumptions behind this 
analysis: fixed costs don't rise as sales increase; Reps won't cut their commission rate for 
higher-volume items; a direct sales force can generate the same sales as the Rep, and can do 
so even when the direct force is of a fixed size and the Rep is of a variable size (Reps add 
personnel or shift selling time from one line to another as sales grow).  Thus, popular stylized 
analysis leads sales directors to simplify the decision: product lines that succeed invariably 
grow into direct selling. 
If the sales director persuades the producer to go direct, the market eventually generates 
feedback on the wisdom of the move.  As noted earlier, this feedback is not unambiguous, 
particularly if the firm is interested in strategic goals (signaling commitment, driving 
markets, keeping strategic control, coping with the future) rather than economic goals (such 
as minimizing the cost/sales ratio given a volume objective).  Escalation of commitment 
(Brockner 1992) is the tendency of managers to overweight previous investment in an 
alternative strategy and so to lobby the organization to invest further in that alternative, even 
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alternative in which s/he has already invested (likely the internal sales force), despite 
information suggesting better alternatives. 
The Organization's Reasons to Accept the Sales Director's
 Recommendation  to  Integrate 
 
  Below we argue that organizations, like their sales directors, are also motivated to 
favor integrating the selling function and capable of distorting information to favor such a 
move.  We note that the mechanisms creating organizational biases and preferences are not 
the same as those that operate at the individual level, although the net result is the same: 
direct sales forces will be favored at the expense of Reps.  First we consider six reasons why 
an organization would favor direct sales a priori: bundling, in-group trustworthiness, belief 
in loyalty, belief in stability, a perception that no good Reps are available, and failure to 
appreciate economies of scope.  We then turn to five reasons why producers that use a Rep 
they might switch to direct selling: the curse of success, closing the legitimacy gap, 
ignorance of how to motivate Reps, scapegoating, and malleable switching cost estimates. 
Why Organizations Favor Vertical Integration A Priori 
 
Bundling sales efforts.  Williamson (1999) flags the problem of bounding a set of 
economic activities.  Decision makers may treat transactions in clusters, introducing 
interaction effects among the decisions for each transaction.  In the selling context, this 
occurs when the firm sells more than one product.  If a direct sales force is appropriate for 
one product (for reasons of idiosyncracy), the producer may erect a sales force for that 
idiosyncratic product, then use that sales force to sell everything else to amortize fixed costs.  
Anderson (1985) finds evidence of such behavior in the Rep/direct context, while Anderson 
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distribution flows to enter foreign markets.  The consequence is that, by bundling sales of 
different products, the producer may creep into fielding a direct sales force to sell a product 
line that largely does not need it.   
One can also bundle functions.  Teece (1992) argues that it is essential to bundle many 
functions that are connected with innovations.  This is because the producer of an innovation 
must generate and protect returns during the long, costly period in which the innovation 
diffuses.  Often, institutional safeguards such as patents offer inadequate protection.  The 
way to gain protection is to integrate into other stages of the value chain when these stages 
are both complementary with and specialized to the innovation.  Such "co-specialized" assets 
are used in conjunction with the innovation, and are necessary to protect the rents accruing as 
the innovation diffuses.  Teece (1992) refers to co-specialized assets as "bottleneck assets;" 
their owner could hold up the producer at some point in the diffusion process and thereby 
extract an excessive share of the innovation's rents.  Prominent in the list of typical co-
specialized assets is sales. 
 
We now turn to factors that come into play once the firm has made the decision to 
outsource the selling function.  We examine forces that make the producer reconsider. 
In-Group Trustworthiness.  Employee salespeople are believed more trustworthy than 
Reps, for reasons anchored in the stereotyping and inter-group categorization literatures.  
Social categorization is ubiquitous because it enables one to economize cognitive efforts (e.g. 
Kramer 1991; Brewer and Brown 1998).  Fiske and Neuberg  (1990) suggest that the more 
distant the object, the less effortful the processing.  Non-sales members of the producing 
organization believe that the sales function is “different,” because selling involves boundary 
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Reps are seen as even more distant than the (already somewhat distant) integrated selling 
function.  Therefore, motivation to form a more precise impression of Reps within the firm is 
generally low.  Reps are seen as a breed of their own, different from the focal organization.  
Further, employee salespeople and Reps compete to carry out the selling function.  
Williams (2001) proposes that competition between two groups has a negative impact on 
perceptions of benevolence and integrity, which are major components of trustworthiness 
(Mayer, Davis and Schoorman 1995).  Because employee salespeople (an in-group) see Reps 
as a competing out-group, they will tend to believe that Reps are less trustworthy.  They may 
transmit this belief, as employee salespeople and/or managers are what (meager) connectors 
Reps have with the rest of the organization. 
Building loyalty.  A major issue in human resource management is how to induce 
employees, particularly those in autonomous jobs, to cooperate fully with their employers 
(Lepak and Snell 1999).  Industrial selling is highly autonomous; therefore, it is critical to 
socialize salespeople.  Yet many producers perceive they enjoy more loyalty on the part of 
their salespeople than is the case (Dubinsky et al. 1986).   
Producers can forge strong relationships with Reps via such mechanisms as building 
relational norms (Heide and John 1992), creating expectations of future interaction (Heide 
and Miner 1992), and exchanging credible commitments (Anderson and Weitz 1992).  
However, the producer is often not fully informed of these possibilities, and suspicious of the 
risks and resources entailed by a relationship-building strategy.  All else constant, the 
organization will overestimate the difficulty of forging a committed Rep relationship while 
underestimating the difficulty of building a socialized sales force.  
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(Lepak and Snell 1999).  Sales forces usually are not stable; salesperson turnover is a major 
and expensive problem for firms (Tyagi and Wotruba 1993).  For at least three reasons, the 
producer may perceive that the turnover problem is accentuated when using Reps.  First, 
managers may frame the issue as losing an employee salesperson versus losing a Rep 
organization.  The process by which a salesperson takes the actual step to quit the firm is 
largely individual (Chandrashekaran, et. al. 2000).  The loss of a single salesperson is an 
isolated event that seldom has firm-wide repercussions.  By contrast, when the firm faces the 
risk of contract termination by a Rep, a larger portion of its sales volume may be at stake.  
Second, non-compete clauses can be used to insure that the competition does not gain a 
salesperson’s specific knowledge.  These clauses are harder to write and enforce in a market 
relationship (Liebeskind, et. al. 1996).  Third, when the firm is using Reps, customers’ 
loyalty may reside with the Rep, not the firm. The relationship between customer and Rep 
may be only minimally affected by termination, as the Rep has complementary product lines 
to sell and can contract with another producer to offer a replacement brand.  Further, the Rep 
can use the continuity of the relationship to disparage the producer's products once it has 
been terminated (Weiss and Anderson 1992). All of this is less likely to happen with 
employee salespeople, many of whom do not stay in contact with their former customers.  
The perception that employee sales forces offer the producer more stability than do Reps 
may not be warranted (although the greater cost of replacing an entire Rep agency, versus a 
single salesperson, must be acknowledged).  The issue may be one of visibility within the 
firm.  The departure of individual salespeople is considered a routine, unavoidable, event 
linked to personal choices and preferences, part of business as usual.  In contrast, termination 
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because it means losing a sales force, not just a salesperson. 
Perception of pre-emption of "good" Reps. A perennial problem in inter-organizational 
relations is that of discovering, then recruiting, suitable partner firms (Gulati 1995).  Given 
that there may be hundreds of Reps in a product line/market, the producer is often at a loss as 
to how to find "the good ones."  Producers know how to find and hire employees: this is a 
normal organizational routine, and the producer may reason that a salesperson is just another 
employee.  But producers may not know how to locate and attract Rep agencies: this is not 
part of their routine.  Routines condition producers' perceptions of their opportunities (Nelson 
1995).  They may perceive that there are no good Reps available.  Part of the view that direct 
sales forces are more stable may thus be the result of an availability bias: traces of switching 
issues are available in memory in the Rep case and less so in the case of the salesperson.   
Ignoring economies of scope.  Organizational preferences for using employee 
salespeople may stem from the failure to appreciate the economies of scope achievable by 
using Reps.  One reason is the lack of visibility of smaller customers’ collective potential. 
Those customers large enough to warrant sales calls with a restricted product line are highly 
visible: focusing on these “big kills” is often regarded as the most efficient way to meet the 
sales target.  Another reason may be an attribution error.  The firm may overstate the benefits 
that a Rep agency derives from having the firm's product in the agency’s portfolio and may 
underestimate the value of the other products to customers.  The producer may thus think that 
its own product line benefits less than do the other products from economies of scope, and 
that the other products are free riders, benefiting excessively from the producer’s lines.  Part 
of the reason is sheer lack of information on customers’ needs for these other products.  
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they represent to underscore efforts for the focal firm. 
Why Producers May Switch from Rep to Direct Sales Forces 
 
We now turn to the case of producers that do use Reps.  We argue that producers are 
often tempted to convert to direct selling, and consider five rationales. 
The Curse of Success.  If a producer uses Reps and the results are good, the firm is more 
likely to stay with its Rep (Weiss, Anderson, and MacInnis 1999).  Surprisingly, even some 
manufacturers that are highly satisfied with their Rep's performance and do credit the Rep 
will replace it with a direct sales force.  Paradoxically, positive market outcomes can have 
negative consequences for the Reps. The sales director may use this favorable market 
outcome to gain clout and credibility, then seize the opportunity to build up his/her own sales 
department (Pfeffer and Salancik 1978).  Further, increased sales raise the likelihood that the 
break-even point of employee salespeople is reached.  One textbook blandly phrases it thus: 
Another time the going gets rough, especially with manufacturers' representatives, is 
when the rep does a good selling job and develops a territorial market so that there is 
enough potential business to support the producer's own sales force.  Then the producer 
wants to cancel its contract with the independent rep.  While this is a normal evolution in 
dealing with manufacturers' reps, it is usually not a pleasant situation.  (Stanton, Buskirk, 
and Spiro 1991, p. 80) 
 
Hence, Reps cite the threat of being "too successful" as one of the three most common 
reasons they fear losing a line (Anonymous 2001). 
Closing the legitimacy gap.  If results under a Rep are disappointing, the producer may 
switch to another Rep, and often do.  But many firms do not pursue this solution out of 
concern for legitimacy.  Weiss, Anderson, and MacInnis (1999) demonstrate that firms 
decide to redress their dissatisfaction by going direct as a function of their "reputation gap."  
The producer holds a belief about how the customer base perceives the Rep and producer 
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that customers have a higher opinion of the producer than of the Rep. This gap is worrisome 
(associating with the Rep may degrade the supplier), so producers seek to redress it.  The less 
costly way to close the gap is usually to change to another Rep that the customer base holds 
in higher esteem.  But producers instead take a more costly route—going direct—if they 
believe that having a direct sales force is what the most legitimate producers in their industry 
do.    When managers believe an in-house sales force is a characteristic of legitimate 
producers, they copy the "legitimate" governance choice and do not consider another Rep.   
  Ignorance of how to motivate Reps. Why not change to more effective ways of 
influencing Reps?  Anderson, Lodish, and Weitz (1987) inventory ways to do so.  However, 
these are inter-firm influence methods, and many firms are not skilled in their use.  Here, the 
sales director is called upon to change operating methods, an implicit admission that earlier 
methods were ineffective.  At least some sales directors will be motivated to conclude the 
problem lies outside their responsibility. 
Scapegoating.  When producers are (rightly or wrongly) disappointed with the results of 
their Rep, the sales director needs to justify the poor results to his/her colleagues and top 
management.  Research at the top management level in poorly performing organizations has 
shown that powerful CEOs are able to buffer themselves from direct responsibility by 
blaming the performance on subordinates and replacing them (Boeker 1992).  These 
subordinate managers play the role of scapegoats (Gamson and Scotch 1964). The same 
situation may apply at a lower hierarchical level to sales directors and other sales managers. 
Girard (1986) underlines three key elements of the scapegoating mechanism.  
Scapegoating requires a) a crisis, b) an accusation, and c) a victim, who is made to shoulder 
the blame.  The accusation is usually brought against those who are observably different.  
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suitable victims: as stand-alone organizations, they do not belong to the firm’s in-group.  A 
basis for the accusation can easily be found.  That Reps work concomitantly for several firms 
may serve as a basis; past critical incidents between the Rep and the producer may also be 
used.  That Rep managers are not physically present inside the producer facilitates the work 
of the accuser, as the Rep cannot properly respond.  
Malleable Switching Cost Estimates.  We have sketched motives for producer 
management (particularly the sales director) to move to a direct sales force when a Rep is in 
place.  However, a Rep-to-direct switch is not always feasible.  Customers may have strong 
ties with their Reps  (Heide and John 1988).  Or principals may face high switching costs in 
other forms.  Weiss and Anderson (1992) study the role of perceived switching costs among 
manufacturers currently using Reps. They model the producer's estimate of the cost of 
dismantling the Rep operation and erecting a direct operation (one-time switching costs).  As 
expected, switching costs depress intentions to switch.  However, Weiss and Anderson 
(1992) also discover a curious simultaneous phenomenon: the producer appears to revise its 
estimate of switching cost to accord with its intention.  Producers intending to switch to 
direct downgrade their cost estimates, while those intending to stay with Reps upgrade their 
cost estimates.  Such gymnastics of logic are easy to conceal because switching costs are 
difficult to estimate, thus necessarily subjective.   
In short, our meso-analysis suggests that at the individual level, the sales director tilts 
the arguments in favor of a company sales force, while at a more aggregate level, the rest of 
the organization is motivated to accept this recommendation.  The stage is ready to embark 
on a vertically integrated path.  Below, we argue several mechanisms—legitimacy, critical 
mass, and asymmetric switching costs—play a dual role (Figure 1).  These mechanisms raise 
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also feed meso-analytic arguments to vertically integrate in the first place. 
Force #3: Path Dependency Mechanisms 
    Lack of Legitimacy of Reps 
 
  The institution of the manufacturers’ representative is poorly understood.  Reps are 
readily confused with distributors or with company salespeople on commission.  It is not 
surprising that if the U.S. Census has difficulty identifying Reps, so do many businesspeople.  
And since Reps account for roughly a tenth of B2B sales in the U.S., there are fewer 
opportunities to correct misimpressions.  Indeed, Reps try to project the image of each of 
their suppliers, and do not promote competing brands.  Thus, their own identity and rationale 
as an institution is not always clear to personnel outside the purchasing function.
4  In short, 
Reps are relatively rare.  We argue that rarity breeds more rarity. 
  An important factor is the producer’s motive to seek legitimacy to improve social 
fitness, even at the expense of some economic fitness (Grewal and Dharwadkar 2002).  A 
firm possesses legitimacy when its constituents see its actions as right and proper.  When in 
doubt, the move considered legitimate is that which is common and taken for granted.  Under 
uncertainty, firms imitate the actions of market leaders, thereby coming to resemble each 
other.  This phenomenon of institutional isomorphism (DiMaggio and Powell 1983) suggests 
that direct sales force will propagate because they will be taken for granted as “normal,” 
which confers legitimacy.  Outsourcing the selling function may be seen as illegitimate 
merely because the Rep is seldom seen.  Thus, many organizations aspire to having their own 
sales force when they become large enough to afford the overhead.   
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what is the profitable decision to make: firms imitate other firms when economic signals are 
unclear (Greve 1996).  We argued earlier that standards of desirable performance are often 
unclear in personal selling.  Specifying and measuring multiple, conflicting, long-term, and 
uncertain objectives opens the door to copying the vertical integration decisions of other 
firms in the selling domain.   
    Need for a Critical Mass 
  
Some markets are thin: they do not support many Reps. For example, a declining 
product category may become so small that few Reps are motivated to carry brands in it; or a 
market may be too small to support multiple Reps. Even a large market may undergo 
consolidation, such that few Reps are left.  An example (Murphy 2001) is the U.S. fast 
moving consumer goods industry.   Hundreds of regional "food brokers" have given way to 
three very large national brokers.  Food brokers achieve overwhelming economies of scope 
and scale: their commissions range from 2 to 5 %, versus costs of up to 10% for direct sales 
forces.  Suppliers that want to outsource need a critical mass of Reps: having only three 
market alternatives blocks a firm from leaving the path of direct selling.  (In this example, 
lack of critical mass encourages a firm to leave the market altogether, unless it has other 
advantages to offset the high cost of direct selling.  This underlies growing concern about 
excessive consolidation in the food industry.)  
Asymmetric Switching Costs 
 
Argyres and Liebeskind (1999) argue that path dependence is a major reason why firms 
violate economic principles.  In our context, path dependence arises when the decision taken 
to rely today on a direct sales force creates a lock-in effect tomorrow.  We argue that 
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Rep than it is to move from Rep to direct.  Thus, the producer that has put a direct sales force 
in place is likely to become trapped in that choice—this is a corridor of no return.  
A major reason is that firms that are failing with direct sales forces will not easily 
convert to Reps. Terminating a division is not easily done (Argyres and Liebeskind 1999).  
The firm's constituents (including customers and employees) may view it as an admission of 
failure.  The sales director will escalate his/her commitment to direct selling, particularly if 
she or he originally urged going direct.  Even in failure, the low inclusiveness of the selling 
function continues to insulate the sales manager's reasoning from some degree of challenge 
by other organization members.   
The more likely path is that the producer, once it acknowledges the poor outcomes, will 
work with its employees to try to raise its results.  Directing employees is a more familiar 
routine than influencing third parties.  Thus, the firm is unlikely to turn to Reps until poor 
results have continued for some time.  Only then will the organization be willing to 
"unlearn," that is, discard what it views as knowledge.  Unlearning is difficult for any 
organization (Huber 1991). 
A more insidious scenario is also common.  Reliance on an integrated sales force has 
been internalized and therefore is not questioned anymore.  Or managers simply may not 
realize that circumstances have changed and could warrant a switch to Reps (Johnson 1987).  
This situation can be described as the “tyranny of incrementalism.”  The dominant way of 
thinking is an incremental one, because it does not question the status quo.  Under this 
pattern, the existing direct sales force may be thought as a “sunk cost,” and new products are 
“naturally” sold through this integrated sales force.   
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expensive to undo a direct organization: switching costs are asymmetric. 
Force #4: Characteristics of the Institution of Reps 
 
  To this point we have focused on reasons for sales directors and organizations to 
favor vertical integration.  We now turn to institutional and environmental barriers that can 
make it difficult to use a Rep even if the producer wishes to do so.  Earlier, we argued that 
producers perceive more scarcity of "good" Reps than is the case.  However, it is true that 
Rep availability is not unlimited, for structural reasons.  The institution of the manufacturers' 
representative, as currently practiced in North America, has three features-- symmetric 
exclusivity, fear of dependence, and local market focus--that complicate the task of entering a 
relationship with a Rep, thereby reinforcing dependency on a vertically integrated path.   
  Symmetric exclusivity.  It is an unquestioned feature of the Rep institution that each 
side grants exclusivity to the other.  Principals appoint only one Rep in a product/market; 
Reps carry only that producer's line in its product category.  This means the company speaks 
with only one voice in a market, while the Rep delivers only one message in each product 
category.  This parallels what companies do with their internal sales forces: it is custom for 
employee salespeople to have exclusive territories, and for management to prevent employee 
salespeople from infringing on each other's assigned customers.  This also means that a Rep 
is loyal not only to its customers but to its principals.  Each side has made a credible 
commitment to the other (Fein and Anderson 1997). 
  Symmetric exclusivity retards the usage of Reps because it is a contractual 
commitment that constrains both sides.  The producer may find that the Rep it would like to 
sign up already carries a competitor.  The Rep might be induced to drop that principal to 
make room, but this does entail switching costs.  Further, a Rep does not want to acquire a 
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prospective principals.  But even if the producer does find a suitable Rep, the growth paths of 
both sides are constrained.  If the Rep wishes to grow geographically, it bumps up against the 
exclusivity the principal has granted to an adjacent Rep. If the producer wishes to grow its 
product line, it bumps up against the brand to which the Rep has already granted exclusivity.    
  Fear of dependence.  Even within a product line and geography, growth can be 
hazardous.  If the Rep grows large, the principal may fear that it is not important to the Rep 
and that it will be neglected.  If the principal grows large, the Rep risks becoming dependent 
by deriving too much of its income from one source.  Anderson, Lodish, and Weitz (1987) 
show that if a principal accounts for more than one third of a Rep's revenue, power becomes 
imbalanced, to the detriment of the Rep's profitability.  It is not easy to keep a growing 
principal to one third of the portfolio: Reps are obliged either to resign the line or to invest to 
grow their entire business to retain balance in their product portfolio.  Heide and John (1988) 
show that Reps need to manage their dependence on principals, and that failure to do so hurts 
the Rep's profitability. 
  Local market focus.  An advantage of Reps is that they are dedicated to one market.  
This becomes a drawback when a producer serves very large customers that insist on being 
served in a uniform manner over all their locations.  Global accounts, for example, may want 
one supplier-specific routine to be applied to every branch.  As a Rep cannot serve every 
branch, the producer must coordinate multiple Reps to adhere to the routine.  The inherent 
coordination challenges create transaction costs.  Further, a Rep will be motivated to bend the 
routine to accommodate its branch, which is precisely what the head of purchasing of the 
global account does not want.  
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Time: A Simulation 
 
Earlier, we proposed that going direct initiates a path that makes it difficult to return to 
the Rep system, because it is more costly to switch from direct to Reps than to convert from 
direct to Reps. To demonstrate the plausibility of this argument, we offer a small-scale 
simulation of how such a process would create a "robust solution" in which firms gravitate to 
direct sales forces more than is justified by considerations of idiosyncracy, performance 
ambiguity, or even strategic goals.   
The switching process of the use of Rep versus direct sales forces over time can be 
modeled as a simple first-order Markov process with two states. The key inputs needed are 
the probability transition matrix and the proportion of firms in each condition at time t0 (start 
of the simulation).  Let π0 be the probability for a firm to start with Reps, and π1 the 
probability that the firm starts with employee salespeople instead, such that π0 = 1 - π1.  Let p 
be the probability that the firm switches from Reps to employee salespeople during one 
period of time (say: one year), and q the probability that the firm switches from employee 
salespeople to Reps during the same period. The asymmetric switching cost argument 
indicates that q tends to be much smaller than p:  
q<<p                   (1) 
 It can be shown that the probability that the firm uses Reps at time n is  (see e.g. Hoel, 
Port and Stone 1972):  
[q/(p+q)] + (1-p-q)
n  [π0 –q/(p+q)] 
Similarly, the probability that the firm uses employee salespeople at time n is:  
[p/(p+q)] + (1-p-q)
n  [π1 –p/(p+q)] 
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5, the probability that the firm uses Reps [respectively: employee 
salespeople] converges toward q/(p+q) [respectively p/(p+q)].  
Inequality (1) implies that: 
q/(p+q) << p/(p+q) 
This last inequality means that over the years, there will be many more firms using 
employee salespeople than firms using Reps. This simple stochastic formulation shows that 
going direct is a robust solution: over a wide range of values, it becomes the more common 
outcome, given enough time.  
Figure 3 illustrates this result with different transition probabilities. In each case, the 
convergence occurs, with firms using Reps becoming a minority. Surprisingly little time is 
necessary for this to occur.  Figure 3 illustrates the rapidity of the convergence process with a 
more limited number of years (n=5 and n=10). In almost all cases, the convergence is fast, as 
illustrated by the small difference between the 5- and the 10-year probability of using Reps. 
The driver of these outcomes is that switching costs are asymmetric: Rep-to-direct is less 
costly than direct-to-Rep.  Hence, a producer that has vertically integrated is unlikely to 
reverse course, even if the path taken is recognized as mistaken.  Tomorrow’s choices are 
constrained by yesterday’s path. 
This simulation is a simple one that overlooks an important effect mentioned earlier, the 
need for a critical mass of Reps to begin with.  Even in an all-Rep world (industry), a 
producer can readily create a direct sales force.  But the reverse is not true.  In an industry 
that is predominantly direct (such as chemicals or pharmaceuticals), it is difficult for a firm to 
switch to Reps, because virtually no Reps exist and it is difficult for a single supplier to start 
a Rep firm ex nihilo.  Reps need multiple complementary lines; if “complementors” don’t use 
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orchestrate complementors.   
In short, if Rep usage drifts downward, the drift can become a spiral that is difficult to 
reverse.  Add to this mimetic isomorphism: firms imitate what they see.  If they don’t see 
Reps in their industry, going direct becomes the unquestioned (and ultimately 
unquestionable) path to too many direct sales forces. 
Breaking Path Dependence 
 
Grewal and Dharwadkar (2002) warn of the dangers of excessively mimicking unstable 
forces (for example, the Internet bubble).  We show that personal selling is the reverse case: 
excessive mimicking of stable forces.  Curiously, this occurs even though there are no 
regulatory forces in North America to constrain outsourcing the selling function.  In contrast, 
restrictive termination laws provide a ready explanation for the scarcity of Reps in Europe. 
If institutional, rather than economic, forces account for the over-usage of employee 
sales forces, there is considerable opportunity to achieve competitive advantage by being a 
contrarian.  This raises the question of which producers will break their dependence on 
vertical integration.  In industries where Reps have become rare, we develop propositions as 
to which firms will be contrarians (switch to Reps) and how well they will fare. 
Occurrence: Which Suppliers Will Switch to Reps  
 
The most likely contrarians are firms that are keen to differentiate themselves and 
obliged to be highly conscious of competitive forces.  This profile fits firms that must 
overcome the handicap of being a follower, suggesting: 
Proposition 1: Market followers are more likely than market leaders to switch to Reps. 
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themselves, but also have the advantage of starting from zero.  Minus the baggage of the 
incumbents, entrants are more likely to break the mold. 
Proposition 2: Market entrants will be more likely to use Reps than will incumbents. 
 
Several propositions follow from the notion of “slack,” or unused organizational 
capacity (Singh 1986).  Firms hold slack as a buffer, enabling them to weather downturns.  
But slack can also cover inefficient decisions.  It follows that firms with less slack will be 
more sensitive to economic arguments for outsourcing selling.  Such firms are smaller, and 
are more focused, preventing them from using one activity to subsidize another.  Further, all 
firms lose slack during industry downturns.  Thus,  
Proposition 3: Smaller firms are more likely to switch to Reps than larger firms. 
 
Proposition 4: Focused firms are more likely to switch to Reps than firms with wider product 
lines. 
 
Proposition 5: Switching to Reps is more likely to occur during an industry downturn. 
 
As firms find their strategy is not working, they come under pressure from outside 
constituents to improve immediate results.  Such firms, having little to lose, become risk 
seekers (Singh 1986).  This reduces barriers to experimentation, such that: 
Proposition 6: The worst the firm's performance, the more likely it will switch to Reps. 
 
Meyer and Zucker (1989) note that many organizations are unable to make needed 
radical changes to rectify poor performance.  They posit a major cause to be “dependent 
actors,” constituents who derive psychic or financial benefits from the failing organization 
and cannot find an equivalent alternative to it.  When such actors (e.g. specialized 
employees) form a coalition, they can block change.  Meyer and Zucker (1989) suggest that 
one means of breaking the resistance of such a coalition is to spin off a division as a new 
 34    corporation.  This isolates selected employees (e.g. the sales force and its director), making it 
difficult for them to ally with other employees to resist change effectively. 
Proposition 7: Switching to Reps is more likely when a division has been spun off from a 
parent corporation. 
 
  Sales forces operating under behavior control develop firm-specific routines and 
strong organizational loyalties (Anderson and Oliver 1987).  They are more likely become 
dependent on a (failing) firm and to organize a coalition of dependent actors to resist change. 
Proposition 8: The less a firm uses behavior control to manage its sales force, the more likely 
it will switch to Reps. 
 
Organizational memory suggests two more propositions.  Hirshleifer and Welch 
(2002) note that some firms readily forget the rationale for their past decisions, either because 
they lose personnel familiar with a prior decision or because they promote to decision 
making roles personnel who were not previously involved.  This is particularly true for large 
firms, in which decision-making is sufficiently complex that a rationale is inherently difficult 
to create, let alone recreate.  Such firms are most likely to forget why they vertically 
integrated selling in the first place, opening the door to experimentation. 
Proposition 9:  Large firms with high personnel turnover, a pattern of early retirement, and 
promotion from outside are more likely to switch to Reps. 
 
Forgetting is also pronounced in volatile environments, because firms need to 
remember their rationale and the circumstances surrounding it in great detail.  This is 
necessary to discern whether, given environmental changes, the rationale can be extended to 
new circumstances (Hirshleifer and Welch 2002).  Hence,   
Proposition 10: Any  firm is more likely to switch to Reps the more volatile its environment. 
Performance: Which Firms Will Do Better? 
 
Absent substantial selling idiosyncracy or internal uncertainty, being a contrarian 
(going to Reps) should yield performance advantages for the supplier.  But some can be 
 35    expected to perform better than others.  Knowing how to work well with a third party is a 
capability that not all firms possess (Madhok 2002).  The most capable suppliers know how 
to learn from their Reps and how to benefit from the Rep’s complementary competencies.  
Which firms are likely to possess such a capability?  We suggest these will be firms with a 
reputation for fairness in how they treat third parties in general, firms with experience in 
building alliances of any sort, and firms with good distributor relationships: these suppliers 
should be able to carry over their know-to their Rep relations.  More generally,  
Proposition 11: Firms with experience in building and maintaining close relationships with 
third parties will achieve higher performance with Reps than other suppliers that switch. 
 
  We suggest there is an order-of-entry effect in industries in which Reps are rare.  The 
first movers face the ex nihilo problem of setting up a Rep, difficult but not impossible.  One 
practice is for vertically integrated firms to set up current and former employees as Reps. 
This allows the firm to profit from the individual's knowledge and relationships, while 
fulfilling the entrepreneurial ambitions of talented people.  This is already commonly used to 
develop franchisees and distributors.  There remains, however, the problem of finding 
complementors, suppliers who are ready to use Reps and round out a fledgling Rep’s 
portfolio.  Suppliers that outsource selling early face a market lacking critical mass.  But the 
first Reps are likely to spawn imitators.  Thus, later switchers to Reps will have been able to 
observe them and discern which are the better players.  This gives an advantage to later 
switchers, but the advantage is not indefinite.  The last switchers will be obliged to find Reps 
among those that have not been taken—perhaps for good reasons.   
Proposition 12: There is an inverted U-shape relationship between the order of switching to 
Reps and the performance level of the selling function.  Early and late switchers will perform 
at a lower level than mid-range switchers. 
Conclusions and Implications 
 
 36    We study the integration of personal selling, using a meso approach.  House, Rousseau, 
and Thomas-Hunt (1995) note that few studies examine the interplay between the individual 
and the organizational level, apart from high-placed individuals, such as the CEO.  We 
underscore the importance of a middle-ranking position that is not inclusive.  Curiously, the 
very isolation of the sales director is why s/he is so powerful in the selling domain. 
Our analysis indicates that the nature of the function and the institution in question is 
important.  An all-purpose treatment of vertical integration, in which any function is viewed 
the same way, overlooks the sensitivity of the selling function (which books the top line of 
the income statement) and overlooks limiting features of the Rep institution, such as the 
convention of symmetric exclusivity.  We focus on the institutional details of the function 
under study, suggesting that they are crucial to understanding how to apply theory to a 
problem.  For example, Pirrong's (1993) study of maritime shipping, and Nickerson, 
Silverman, and Freeman's (1997) study of the trucking industry rely on a thorough grasp of 
the operational aspects of these functions.  Only with this detail could the authors ascertain 
opportunities for specific assets to arise in these seemingly commodity-like settings.   
Research opportunities abound in this area.  Compared to distributors, relatively little is 
known about Reps their functioning, and about how producers deal with them.  Balancing the 
research attention affords rich opportunity to develop new theory and normative implications.  
In particular, Reps are entrepreneurs (as are many of the producers that contract with them).  
Outsourced selling offers an area for studying entrepreneurial processes and outcomes. 
Grewal and Dharwadkar (2002, p. 97) call on managers to "focus on observing the 
obvious and studying the mundane."  It is obvious that most firms of any size employ most of 
the men and women who book revenue, and that vertical integration of selling is mundane.  
Yet, today firms consider outsourcing even the human resource function, production, supply 
 37    chain management, R&D, and computing.  Too many firms employ salespeople to sell too 
many products and services.  We suggest that firms experiment with the idea that outsourcing 
at least some of their selling should be mundane.   




                                                 
1 The U.S. Census of Economic Activity tracks manufacturers' agents as a category separate from other types of 
sales agents, such as commission merchants, import agents, export agents, and brokers.  All these entities are 
sales agents insofar as they do not purchase the goods and then resell them.  Given this, the distinctions among 
these categories are somewhat blurred.  Brokers, in particular, are difficult to classify.  Technically, they 
represent both buyers and sellers.  However, in practice, some brokers represent primarily agents and some 
primarily sellers.  In some industries, such as fast moving consumer goods, "broker" is a misnomer: these 
companies are classic agents.  It is noteworthy that the economic census is based largely on tangible products 
("merchandise").  Comparable statistics are difficult to establish for reps selling services that are not tied to a 
physical product (for example, radio reps sell the advertising time of multiple, non-competing radio stations). 
 
2 For example, a long article in a major business magazine documents how an entrepreneur used eight employee 
salespeople to build a successful firm during a strong economy.  When the economy softened, the owner tried 
every way to more productively manage his salespeople.  A stubbornly high cost/sales ratio finally led the 
owner to pursue the only solution that he could see: firing all the salespeople and neglecting the business to 
become his own sales force—of one.  This, too, produced disappointing results, which led the owner—and the 
reporter—to conclude that these are difficult times to be in business.  The option of outsourcing selling is never 
raised (Greco 2003), even though it is plain the producer suffered from ignorance of how to manage sales and 
that his limited product line would benefit from being part of a larger assortment.   
 
3 As per the U.S. Census of Economic Activity. 
 
4 During a lecture in a sales force management course, one of our students gasped, “Now I understand how my 
father makes his living!  He’s a Rep!  I always wondered why he sold so many different brands.” 
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Figure 2: Chain Agency Comparisons Between Reps and Integrated Salesforces 
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Force #1: Characteristics of the Selling 
Function 
  
Low Inclusiveness of Director and of Function  Organization Cognitive 
Ambiguous Standards of Desirable Performance    
   Sales performance is inherently multi-faceted  Environment  Cognitive 
   Direct sales force costs are unknown  Organization  Cognitive 
   Baseline issue  Environment  Cognitive 
   Strategic goal: signaling market commitment  Organization  Normative 
   Strategic goal: driving market Organization  Normative 
   Strategic goal: control individuals directly 
   (circumvent chain agency problem) 
Organization Normative 
   Strategic goal: coping with unspecified future 
   Contingencies 
Organization Normative 
Force #2: Meso Analysis Within Organization    
Influence of the Director of Sales    
   Director overstates idiosyncracy  Individual  Cognitive 
   Director overstates asset value  Individual  Cognitive 
   Director prefers to manage an internal sales 
   division to advance own career (subgoal 
   pursuit) 
Individual Normative 
Perceptual Biases:    
   Availability (salience in in-house personnel)  Individual  Cognitive 
   Overconfidence (ability to solve problems via 
   employee salespeople) 
  
   Persistence of set (continue using ineffective 
   strategies) and functional fixedness (ignore less 
   obvious ways to use an entity or an object) 
Individual   Cognitive 
   Motivated decision maker (distort evidence to 
   justify a categorization) 
Individual Cognitive 
   Convention of stylized break-even analysis  Individual  Cognitive 
   Escalation of commitment  Individual  Normative 
Organization’s Reasons to Accept Sales 
Director’s Recommendation to Integrate Selling 
  
   Organizations underestimate task difficulty of 
   selling 
Organization Cognitive 
   Frame decision as bundle of products  Organization  Cognitive 
   Frame decision as protecting co-specialized 
   assets 
Organization Cognitive 
   In-group trustworthiness Organization  Cognitive 
   Perception: can't build loyalty except among 
   employees 
Organization Cognitive 
   Perception: employee salesforce is more stable  Organization  Cognitive 
Table 1: Institutional Forces for Vertical Integration of Sales 
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   Perception: "Good" Reps are less available than 
   they really are 
Organization Cognitive 
   Overlooking economies of scope  Organization  Cognitive 
   Reps in place: curse of success  Organization  Normative 
   Reps in place: closing legitimacy gap  Organization  Normative 
   Reps in place: ignorance of how to motivate 3d 
   parties 
Organization Cognitive 
   Reps in place: scapegoating  Individual  Cognitive 
   Reps in place: malleable switching cost 




Force #3: Path Dependence Mechanisms    
Lack of Legitimacy of Reps    
   Sales directors experienced as direct 
   salespeople 
Individual Cognitive 
   Organizations are unfamiliar with Reps   Organization  Cognitive 
   Concern for legitimacy (mimetic isomorphism)  Organization  Normative 
Need for a Critical Mass of Reps  Environment ---  (not 
institutional) 
Asymmetric Switching Costs    
   Difficulty of terminating a division  Organization  Normative 
   Routine: work with employees to resolve  
   problems 
Organization Cognitive 
   Difficulty of unlearning  Organization  Cognitive 
   Tyranny of incrementalism (don't question 
   status quo) 
Organization Cognitive 
   Shortage of complementors once Reps become 
   rare 
Environment ---  (not 
institutional) 
Force #4: The Institution of the Rep    
Symmetric exclusivity  Environment  Normative 
Fear of dependence  Environment  Normative 
Local market focus  Environment  Normative 
 
 
 